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ARGUMENT 
I. The Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of review. 
The Court of Appeals applied an abuse of discretion standard, rather than the 
appropriate correctness standard. Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) is plain on its face and 
contains no express or implied grant of authority. Without analysis, but in support of its 
determination, the Court of Appeals asserts that the term "reasonably" "is a broad, general, 
and subjective concept" that, standing alone, gives the Commission implied authority to 
interpret the statute when promulgating agency rules. LPI Servs. v. Labor Comm'n, 2007 
UT App. 375, |15, 173 P.3d 858 (reasoning that the statute "implicitly granted the 
Commission deference" because "[t]he Utah legislature did not and has not defined what the 
term 'reasonably' means in the context of this statute.") Based upon this limited information, 
one must presume that the Court of Appeals found the statute to be ambiguous. However, 
a fair reading of Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) shows that it is plain on its face with no implied 
grant of authority for additional interpretation. Moreover, this Court has directed that the 
term "reasonably" is defined by the statute. Therefore, the Commission has no discretion to 
interpret the statute and the appropriate standard of review is correctness. 
A. Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) is plain on its face and grants no discretion to 
the Labor Commission to decide if its own administrative rules conflict 
with state legislation. 
The Commission states that Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) must be construed according 
to its plain meaning. With this, Petitioners agree. Comparing the statute with the 
Commission's rule, it is apparent that the administrative rule is invalid because it goes 
1 
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beyond the plain meaning of the statute and imposes additional conditions that clearly were 
not contemplated by the legislature when it passed the current form of the statute. Section 
413(l)(c)(iv) states the following: 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the 
commission shall conclude that: 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably 
available, taking into consideration the employee's age, 
education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual 
functional capacity. 
A close reading of the relevant parts of the statute shows that the statute is plain on its face 
and, therefore, not subject to further interpretation by the Commission. Nor is the 
Commission authorized, under the plain meaning of the statute, to consider other 
requirements in order to implement the legislature's intent. Based upon the plain meaning 
of the statute, the Commission must determine whether an injured worker can perform other 
employment that is reasonably available, taking into consideration that worker's age, 
education, past work experience, medical capacity and residual functional capacity. 
McGee and the Labor Commission cite no authority for the grant of discretion because 
none exists. In general, the Court defers to an administrative agency's interpretation of a 
statute when that agency's expertise is necessary. Whether an administrative rale conflicts 
with legislation should not depend upon the agency's expertise since the agency would not 
have promulgated the rale if it believed that the rale was in conflict with the statute. For that 
reason alone, such a determination is a classic judicial determination. No discretion was 
granted by the Legislature in this circumstance because none is necessary. The judiciary, not 
2 
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an administrative agency, is best suited to determine whether an administrative rule conflicts 
with a state statute. 
B. Granting discretion to the Commission to determine if its own rules 
conflict with legislation is bad judicial policy 
Granting discretion in this circumstance even cedes judicial authority to the Labor 
Commission. Administrative rules are drafted and promulgated by the Commission with the 
belief that they do not conflict with legislation. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1 -104(1) (2006). 
To defer to the Commission to decide if its own rule conflicts with legislation is tantamount 
to allowing the fox to guard the henhouse; it essentially hands over judicial review to the 
Commission. There is no need for deference in this circumstance, and granting such 
deference was an error of the Court of Appeals that has a widespread impact on all 
permanent total disability cases that must be corrected. 
C. The Court of Appeals ignored case law from this Court that explains that 
the statute already defines the term "reasonably" for purposes of the 
statute 
The Commission erroneously claims that because the word "reasonably" is used in the 
statute that this single term somehow grants wholesale discretion to determine whether an 
administrative rule conflicts with legislation. The use of one term is not a grant of discretion 
for a question of law. In this case, the term simply allows the Labor Commission discretion 
to apply the law to the facts, not to decide if a rule conflicts with a statute. 
3 
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The Court of Appeals ignores this Court's holding in Martinez v. Media-Paymaster 
Plus / Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. In that case, the Martinez Court stated 
as follows: 
[t]he statute asks the Commission to determine if other work is reasonably 
available, "taking into consideration the employee's [ ] . . . age; . . . 
education; . . . past work experience; . . . medical capacity; and . . . 
residual functional capacity." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (l)(c)(iv). 
These factual considerations inform what is reasonable; its parameters 
are not further defined by an overarching legal principle, as in the case of 
reasonable suspicion, for example. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. 
2007 UT 42, «P2,164 P.3d 384 (emphasis added.) From the above, it is clear that this Court 
determined that the employee's "age, education, past work experience, medical capacity and 
residual functional capacity" were the factors for the Commission to consider when asked 
to make a determination whether or not alternative employment was "reasonably available" 
to the injured worker. In other words, the term "reasonably" is not broad or generalized as 
asserted by the Court of Appeals and Respondents. It is a defined term. 
Because the term "reasonably" is defined and, therefore, not broad or generalized, the 
statute neither grants the Commission implied authority, nor allows for the Commission to 
draft rules that add additional factors that expand the statute. Without a grant of discretion, 
Utah law is clear that the appropriate Standard of Review is Correctness. See, e.g.. Draughon 
v. Dep't of Financial Institutions. 1999 UT App 42, fflf 4-7, 975 P.2d 935; Sanders Brine 
Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 846P.2d 1304,1306 (Utah 1993). As 
discussed in further detail below, these cases are not distinguishable because the Commission 
had no implied authority. 
4 
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D. Respondents fail to address the grammatical structure of the statute, 
which does not give the Commission discretion, and therefore requires a 
correctness standard of review 
Respondents have failed to address the rule of the last antecedent. Instead of 
following Martinez and having the statutory factors define "other work reasonably 
available," Respondents essentially rewrite the statute and transpose clauses. As the 
Martinez Court directs, the clause "taking into consideration . . ." modifies the clause 
"reasonably available," which modifies the term "other work." Therefore, the five factors 
determine what is reasonably available, which is an assessment of other work. The Court of 
Appeals and the Commission assert, however, that the clause "taking into consideration . . 
." modifies the clause "the employee cannot perform." Grammatically, it does not; and 
respondents cannot explain this, nor have they tried. The Respondents' interpretation would 
have this clause modify "the employee cannot perform," which is not how the statute was 
drafted. When analyzing the grammatical structure of the statute as indicated by Barnhart 
v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20,26 (2003), the term "reasonably" is defined and the Commission has 
no implied discretion to interpret it otherwise. 
II. The Rule impermissibly expands the statute and is therefore invalid. 
Instead of properly analyzing whether the administrative rule conflicts with the statute, 
the Court of Appeals adopted an improper standard of review, then improperly deferred to 
the Commission to decide if its own rule conflicted with the statute. The rule conflicts for 
the various reasons outlined in the opening brief, and the administrative agency is not the 
proper entity to decide if the rule conflicts with the statute. 
5 
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A. The Court of Appeals Disregarded the Plain Statutory Language and 
Substituted Other Factors for the Five Factors Mandated by the 
Legislature. 
Utah Code Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) expressly states that in order to be 
permanently disabled, an employee must prove that he cannot perform "other work 
reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's age, education, past work 
experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity." (Emphasis added). 
Instead of harmonizing the statute, the Court of Appeals stops short after the phrase 
"reasonably available," and then substitutes administrative rule factors for the five statutory 
factors delineated by the legislature when the statute was passed. Proper analysis harmonizes 
the entire language, including the phrase "taking into consideration [the five factors]." Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) (2007). 
Instead of properly "taking into consideration" the five statutory factors, the Court of 
Appeals reasons that "[a] determination of what constitutes other work reasonably available 
necessarily requires the Commission to consider... (1) the personal, physical characteristics 
of the injured employee, and (2) the prospective job market." LPIServs., 2007 UT App 375 
at Tfl7. The Legislature never said that a determination of what constitutes other work 
reasonably available requires consideration of "(1) the personal, physical characteristics of 
the injured employee, and (2) the prospective job market." Rather, the Legislature stated that 
a determination of what constitutes other work reasonably available requires "taking into 
consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, 
and residual functional capacity." The Court of Appeals should not be permitted to re-
6 
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write the statute by creating new areas of analysis, and the Commission should not be 
permitted to re-write the statute by adding factors that were rejected by the legislature when 
the statute was originally passed. 
B. The Court of Appeals Disregarded Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus 
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus / Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is 
clear that the five statutory factors determine whether other work is reasonably available. 
Therefore, Martinez, not only affects the standard of review, but addresses the statutory 
construction. Martinez reiterates the five statutory factors and then specifically states: 
These factual considerations inform what is reasonable; its parameters 
are not further defined by an overarching legal principle, as in the case of 
reasonable suspicion, for example. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. 
2007 UT 42, at |32, 164 P.3d 384 (emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals' failure to 
require the Commission to consider and apply the five statutory factors is contrary to 
Martinez. Without reference to this Court's holding in Martinez, or without even mentioning 
the five statutory factors, the Court of Appeals stated, "'reasonableness' is a broad, general, 
and subjective concept; its meaning depends on the context in which it is applied. Therefore, 
the legislature's use of the word 'reasonably' in Utah Code Section 34A-2-413 'bespeak[s] 
a legislative intent to delegate [its] interpretations to the [Commission].'" LPI Servs., 2007 
UT App 375 at ^ [15 (citations omitted). In addition to contradicting the statutory language, 
this contradicts the Supreme Court's direction in Martinez. This Court should not permit the 
Court of Appeals to ignore Martinez. 
7 
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G. The Legislative History of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 indicates that the 
Legislature specifically considered and rejected the additional 
considerations that were incorporated in the Commission's administrative 
rule. 
A review of the legislative history of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 reveals that the 
administrative rule is an attempt to permit the consideration of various factors that were 
evaluated by the legislature and expressly rejected. Such an end run around the legislative 
process should not be sanctioned by this Court. The Labor Commission, as an administrative 
agency created by the legislative process, has no authority to promulgate rules that expand 
on the statute and contain provisions expressly rejected in enacting the legislation at its 
inception. 
The Commission argues that the statute is plain on its face and therefore not subject 
to analysis based on the legislative history.1 At the same time, however, the Labor 
Commission promulgated a rule, purportedly to clarify ambiguity in the statute. This 
argument demonstrates the inconsistency of the Labor Commission and that the rule was 
improperly promulgated in contradiction to a plain and direct statute. Petitioners agree that 
the statute is plain on its face and the term "reasonably" is defined by the statute itself. 
However, the Labor Commission must have believed that the statute was ambiguous because 
it thought a rule was somehow necessary to fill in what the statute presumably left out. Such 
a tacit claim of ambiguity requires us to turn to the legislative history, not the administrative 
1
 The Commission relies on Kitches & Zorn v. Yong Woo Kim, 112 P.3d 1210 at 
1212 for the proposition that legislative history is not relied upon in cases where the 
statute is plain and unambiguous. However, the court in Kitches still evaluated the 
legislative history, which they found consistent with their opinion. Id. at n. 1. 
8 
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body that applies the statute. The Court of Appeals gave no opinion on the legislative history 
and, because it is not favorable to the Commission, the respondents attempt to avoid the issue 
by claiming that the legislative history is too limited and confused. (Comm'n Br. at 16.) 
While legislative intent of some statutes may be difficult to discern, it is clear in the 
instant case that factors expressly rejected by the legislature were made part of the 
administrative rule. Such an end-run around the legislative process is improper. For 
example, the administrative rule purports to permit the consideration of whether "[t]he work 
is either within the distance that a resident of the claimant's community would consider to be 
a typical or acceptable commuting distance, or is within the distance the claimant was 
traveling to work prior to his or her accident."2 This "locality of the work" factor was 
rejected by the Senate on two occasions. Senator Taylor proposed to include as a factor 
whether work was available "within the same proximity as that formerly held." In discussing 
2
 Utah Administrative Code R612-M0 
D. For purposes of this rule, the following standards and definitions apply: 
1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical restrictions and 
other provisions of the Act and rules, other work is reasonably available 
to a claimant if such work meets the following criteria: 
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of the claimant's 
community would consider to be a typical or acceptable commuting 
distance, or is within the distance the claimant was traveling to work prior 
to his or her accident; 
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and 
c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to: 
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time of the 
accident the claimant was earning more than the state 
average weekly wage then in effect; or 
(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the 
accident, if the employee was earning less than the state 
average weekly wage then in effect. 
Utah Admin. Code R612-1-10.D.1.C (2007) (emphasis added). 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
this proposal, it was even mentioned that the legislature should not abdicate authority to the 
administrative agency. Another proposal was to insert the term "local economy" to 
determine whether work was reasonably available. Both proposed amendments failed. (1995 
General Legislative Session, Senate Bill 123, Senate Floor Debates, Day 37.) The 
administrative rule now purports to permit consideration of this very thing that was discussed 
and expressly rejected by the Senate: the locality of the work. Utah Admin. Code R612-1-
1 O.D.I.a (2007), n.4, supra. 
Regardless of whether the legislative history is clearly articulated, one thing is certain 
- issues that are now part of the administrative rule, i.e. wage3 and location, were discussed. 
Neither was incorporated into the statute. Therefore, whether the legislative history makes 
clear the discussion regarding these issues, the decision is plain - consideration of wage and 
location were rejected by the legislature. However, rather than go before the legislature to 
have these issues re-addressed, the Commission, without authority to do the same, created 
a rule that impermissibly expands on the statute and adds the factors of wage and location 
when the legislature specifically declined to do so following floor debate on the issues. The 
Labor Commission must respect the legislative process and results, and not promulgate a rule 
as an end-run around legislation that rejected factors the Commission wants to consider. 
3
 The Court will recall from the opening brief the discussion of the floor debates 
in the House of Representatives. Representative Adair was asked to address the 
hypothetical similar to the instant case - the "engineer who can get a minimum wage 
job"; and this issue of wages was debated. In the end, Representative Adair explained 
that the statutory language was the result of a "great compromise" that came as a result of 
years of study in the Industrial Commission with both workers and employers represented 
in the discussions. 
10 
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D. The statutory term "Past Work Experience" does not include wages, and 
especially not the "current state average weekly wage" 
McGee argues that wages are a subset of past work experience and, therefore, the Rule 
does not expand on the statute. McGee asserts that Petitioners used only a partial definition 
of past work experience. However, using McGee's own definitions, the result is the same -
wages are not a subset of past work experience. 
McGee states: 
Webster's dictionary defines past as: "1 a: ago <12 years past> 
b: just gone or elapsed <for the past few months>"; work as: 
"(1) activity in which one exerts strength or faculties to do or 
perform something (a): sustained physical or mental effort to 
overcome obstacles and achieve an objective or result (b): the 
labor, task, or duty that is one's accustomed means of 
livelihood"; and, experience as: 1 (a): direct observation of or 
participation in events as a basis of knowledge (b): the fact or 
state of having been affected by or gained knowledge through 
direct observation or participation." 
(McGee's Br. at 21.) Without any further explanation, McGee claims that, "if an employee 
participated in work that paid wages, then those wages are part of her 'past work 
experience.'" However, nowhere in McGee's own definitions can one find the term "wage." 
Instead, the definitions are consistent with LPI's argument that wages are not a subset of past 
work experience. "Work" is defined as the physical or mental effort, or the labor task, or 
duty. These definitions relate to skills and abilities, not wages. "Experience" is essentially 
defined as observation or participation that allows for learning; this is not synonymous with 
earnings or wages. The term "past" clearly has no application. Instead of even considering 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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past wages, the rule purports to permit the consideration of "[t]he current state average 
weekly wage." Utah Admin. Code R612-1-10.D.1.C (2007). 
Therefore, wages, especially "[t]he current state average weekly wage," are not a 
subset of past work experience. Including factors that were discussed and debated and 
rejected by the legislature is improper, and doing so by rule impermissibly expands the 
statute. The rule conflicts with the statute and is therefore invalid. 
E. McGee, the Labor Commission, and the Court of Appeals are inconsistent 
and contradictory. 
The Court of Appeals' decision erroneously states that "[a] determination of what 
constitutes other work reasonably available necessarily requires the Commission to consider 
various factors, which the Commission categorizes in two ways: (1) the personal, physical 
characteristics of the injured employee, and (2) the prospective job market." LPI Servs. v. 
Labor Comm'n. 2007 UT App. 375, ^ 17, 173 P.3d 858. However, this ignores both the 
statute and Martinez. Rather, "a determination of whait constitutes other work reasonably 
available necessarily requires the consideration of... "the employee's age, education, past 
work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) (2007); Martinez. 2007 UT 42, at 1|32, 164 P.3d 384 ("These factual 
considerations inform what is reasonable"). Creating a brand new analytical framework was 
error - the statute already provides the analytical framework. 
Because of this new framework, the Court of Appeals' Order, and now the 
Respondents two Briefs, present inconsistent arguments. The Court of Appeals permits the 
consideration of a non-statutory factor in both categories of analysis. The Court of Appeals 
12 
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contends that past wages are part of the second category- the prospective job market. LPI 
Sevs,, 2007 UT App 375 at ]fl9. However, the Court of Appeals also contends that wages 
are part of past work experience, which is part of the first category. LPISevs., 2007 UT App 
375 at TJ22. In other words, not only does the Court of Appeals permit the consideration of 
a non-statutory factor, but it permits its consideration in categories of its new framework. 
This inconsistency reflects the Court of Appeals' flawed analysis that must be remedied, 
returning the proper analysis to the statutory framework. 
In paragraph 19, the Court of Appeals claims that the five statutory factors, including 
"past work experience," fall within category (1)- the characteristics of the injured employee; 
and that the Rule's wage requirement falls within category (2) - the prospective job market. 
A different approach is then articulated in paragraph 22. The Court of Appeals states, 
[T]he Commission has the authority to evaluate the additional 
factors in rule 612-1-10.D.1 concerning the prospective job 
market because those factors more clearly define the "past work 
experience" factor found in Utah Code Section 34A-2-413. We 
conclude that past work experience necessarily raises the issues 
associated with a competitive labor market, including wages. 
LPI at ^ [22 (internal citations omitted). This now claims that the current state average weekly 
wage is part of category (1) as a subset of past work experience. In other words, three 
paragraphs after claiming that wages, including the state average weekly wage, were part of 
analytical category (2), the Court of Appeals claims that wages fall within category (1) as 
a subset of past work experience. 
As explained above, wages (and especially not the current state average weekly wage) 
are not a subset of "past work experience," a factor that relates to the injured workers ability 
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to perform the job, as suggested by the factors created by the Court of Appeals and 
Commission, and a factor of the prospective job market. The different sets of factors are 
inconsistent and illustrate the Court of Appeals' flawed decision. If wages were part of "past 
work experience," neither the Court of Appeals, nor the Commission, would have needed to 
go through the gymnastics necessary to create two categories of analysis not plainly 
identified in the statute. 
No contortions are needed in this matter. The statute contains five factors that do not 
include wages, much less the current state average weekly wage. The rule expands the 
statute, which is contrary to Utah law and the legislative intent. 
F. Construction Rule of the Last Antecedent 
As noted briefly above in discussing the standard of review, the Commission ignores 
the rule of the last antecedent. See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20,26 (2003) (discussing 
the application of this rule). 
This Court followed the rule of the last antecedent in Martinez. As Martinez directs, 
the clause "taking into consideration . . ." modifies the clause it follows: "reasonably 
available," which modifies the phrase it follows: "other work." Instead of following 
Martinez and the rule of the last antecedent, the Commission would essentially rewrite the 
statute and transpose clauses. The five statutory factors do not inform what the employee can 
or cannot perform. Rather, the five statutory factors "inform what is reasonable." Martinez, 
2007 UT 42, at ^ [32,164 P.3d 384. The rule of the last antecedent is completely contrary to 
what the Court of Appeals and the Commission assert - that the clause "taking into 
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consideration..." modifies the clause "the employee cannot perform." When construing the 
statute in accordance with the rule of the last antecedent as indicated bvBarnhart v. Thomas. 
540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003), the five statutory factors modify or "inform" what is reasonably 
available. As a result, the Court of Appeals' decision is flawed and must be overturned. 
G. The case law is not distinguishable. 
The Labor Commission attempts to distinguish the cases cited by LPI. It does this, 
however, from a faulty premise. The Commission argues that the cases are distinguishable 
because, it claims, discretion should be permitted. (Comm'n Br. at 13-15.) This premise is 
incorrect for the reasons outlined in Section I - no discretion was granted by the legislature 
to interpret the statute and determine if an administrative rule conflicts with the statute. This 
court should not be misled into thinking the instant case involves a factual determination or 
a mixed question of law and fact. It does not. The instant case is a straightforward legal 
issue: whether an administrative rule conflicts with a statute. As a result, the cases are not 
distinguishable and therefore require reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision. See Sanders 
Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 846P.2d 1304,1306 (Utah 1993) 
(invalidating an administrative rule that improperly defined who was entitled to a tax 
exemption because the "Commission relied upon an administrative rule that impermissibly 
narrowed the availability of the exemptions."); Draughon v. Dep't of Financial Institutions, 
1999 UT App 42, 975 P.2d 935 (invalidating an administrative rule because the employee's 
"involuntary reassignment," as defined by the administrative rule, violated the statutory 
prohibition against "demotions"). These cases require invalidation of Administrative Rule 
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R612-1-10.D.1.C. because the administrative rule, both on its face and as applied by the 
Commission, improperly modifies the statutory factors. 
H. The rule, not the statute, creates an "absurd result." 
The Commission argues that eliminating a wage consideration for permanent total 
disability claims works an "absurd result" because, it claims, someone making a high wage 
might have to go back to work earning a lower wage. Just because the legislation results in 
a result that is undesirable to McGee and the Commission does not mean that the legislation 
creates an absurd result. Arguably, it is just as "absurd" to declare someone permanently and 
totally disabled and say that person cannot work when that person is capable of working at 
available jobs. These competing arguments were considered and debated in the legislative 
process, which resulted in the "compromise" legislation that was enacted. The Labor 
Commission has no authority to substitute its judgment for that of the elected legislators 
whose authority it is to create and modify the law in Utah. 
The Commission suggests that the legislation may result in a race to the bottom to 
minimum wage jobs. There is no support for this contention. Employers will present other 
work that is reasonably available in light of the individual's age, education, and past work 
experience. There is no incentive to present minimum wage jobs as alternatives. Employers 
have an incentive to get injured workers back to work, consistent with the statutory purposes, 
regardless of whether the wage pays more or less than the employee's previous job. When 
the factors to be considered include age, education, and past work experience, there will be 
no race to the bottom. There is no support for thinking that minimum wage jobs will be the 
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result of any rule. Moreover, LPI is not suggesting this; the purported race to the bottom is 
a red herring. An applicant with transferable skills gained from education and past work 
experience (two statutory factors) will be able to be presented with work. Applying the 
proper statutory factors, there can be no race to the bottom. 
As noted in the opening brief, Senator Adair, in response to the question about 
whether an engineer should take a minimum wage job, made the comment, "Only if he is 
permanently, totally disabled, and it has to meet his medical requirements also." (1995 
General Legislative Session, Senate Bill 123, House of Representatives Floor Debates, Day 
44.) In other words, the engineer doesn't have to take the minimum wage job if it is not a 
"reasonably available" job taking into consideration his age, education, past work experience, 
medical capacity and functional residual capacity. In the instant case, these factors were 
never even mentioned by the Commission, much less taken into consideration. 
How this assessment works can be seen in two classes of workers, "white collar," such 
as an engineer, and "blue collar" workers who depend on physical labor or their functional 
capacity, such as a coal miner, with usually minimal education. The respective education and 
past work experience differs for both, and so whether a particular position is "reasonably 
available" must take into account each individual's own personal education and past work 
experience. How potential work compares to the state average weekly wage is not a factor. 
The injuries maybe different (mental impairment or physical impairment may have different 
effects on different workers' future employability given their respective educational and past 
work experiences), but whether an individual is disabled has nothing to do with wages. For 
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example, a white-collar engineer might sustain a head injury, limiting future employability; 
while a "blue-collar" coal miner might suffer a physical injury. Whether each is permanently 
totally disabled depends on the application of the five factors, including education and past 
work experience, despite the wage the available jobs pay. Once age, education, past work 
experience, medical capacity and functional residual capacity are taken into consideration, 
whether a job is reasonably available can be determined. Just considering the rule and its 
factors of locality and the current state average weekly wage, without even mentioning the 
statutory factors, is improper. 
Additionally, this fear that an ALJ will somehow decide that reasonably available 
work for a white-collar professional with significant education and past work experience is 
a minimum wage job, although unfounded, is an argument that should be made to the 
Legislature. The legislation was the result of deliberation, debate, and compromise. To 
create a rule that is an end-run around the statute is a blatant disregard of legislative 
authority. McGee and the Commission apparently fail to appreciate the fact that the Labor 
Commission has no inherent authority. All powers, rights, duties, and responsibilities of the 
Utah Labor Commission are granted by the Utah Legislature. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-103 
(1997). As a result, because the Commission is a creature of statute, it must comply with the 
statutory mandate or seek modification of the statute with the Legislature - even if the 
Commission dislikes the legislation. See, e.g.. Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 
UT App 370, TJ43,38 P.3d 969 (stating that arguments "are best directed to the Legislature"); 
Rekward v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 755 P.2d 166,169 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating that 
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"[ajlthough we sympathize with [the applicant's] unfortunate situation, the problem must be 
solved by the legislature and not this Court."). If the Labor Commission wants to consider 
the stability of possible future work, the work's location, the wage attached to the possible 
future work, and the state average weekly wage, it must persuade the Legislature to include 
these factors as statutory considerations. Otherwise, it should apply the statutory factors, 
which when properly applied, will lead to reasonable results. 
Finally, to make a final finding of permanent total disability, the Commission takes, 
simplistically, three steps regarding the employment analysis. However, The Commission, 
under its Rule, considers wages in only part of this analysis, instead of all three parts (or none 
of the parts as the legislature initially enacted the analysis), which creates an absurd result. 
The analysis works as follows. First, the Commission determines that, 
(iii) the industrial. . . impairments prevent the employee from 
performing the essential functions of the work activities for 
which the employee has been qualified until the time of the 
industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for 
the employee's permanent total disability claim; 
§34A-2-413(l)(c) (emphasis added). Second, the Commission must make the determination 
that no other work is reasonably available under subsection (iv). Third, 
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of 
reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah 
Injured Worker Reemployment Act; 
§ 34A-2-413(6)(a).4 
4
 In Thomas v. Color Country Management. 2004 UT 12, 84 P.3d 1201, this Court 
explained the second and third steps of the process for determining whether an employee 
is entitled to permanent total disability compensation. Id at ^[20-23. The court 
explained that the process "requires that a finding be issued in two parts - an initial 
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The evaluation of "work activities for which the employee has been qualified," (the 
first step) and Chapter 8 and its rules (the third step), contain no wage requirement. Wages 
have never been part of the second step, either, until the Commission created the new 
administrative rule. Only through the creation of Rule 612-1 -10.D. 1 did the Commission add 
a wage component to the permanent total statute. Now, the practical effect of this is that a 
previously held job, or a prospective job identified in a reemployment plan, is not subject 
to a wage requirement, but a prospective job identified as "other work reasonably available," 
without a need for a reemployment plan is subject to a wage requirement. The "absurd 
result" being that if an employee was previously employed in a job that he or she can now 
perform, a job that paid less than the state average weekly wage, that employee is not 
permanently totally disabled; but if an employee was not previously employed at that same 
job that he or she can still now perform, he or she is permanently and totally disabled if the 
wage is less than the state average weekly wage. Similarly, a job rejected as "other work 
reasonably available" based on wage can be considered in the reemployment plan as 
appropriate gainful employment regardless of wage. Such an application of this new rule is 
"absurd" and creates an administrative process that is inconsistent with the statutorily-
mandated analytical framework. 
finding and a final finding." Id at ^ | 21. The initial finding (steps 1 and 2) is governed by 
§ 34A-2-413 (l)(c), but only step 2 is purportedly subject to the new wage rule. The 
second step of the hearing process (step 3) noted in subsection (6)(a)(iii), consideration of 
a reemployment plan that will return the injured worker to work, is not governed by the 
new wage rule, but by Chapter 8, as noted in subsection (6)(a)(i). 
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McGee and the Commission attack the legislation as creating an "absurd" result 
because it creates a result that is unfavorable to McGee. An unfavorable result is not 
necessarily absurd. Indeed, requiring someone who is capable of working to work is not 
"absurd"; and it is arguably just as "absurd" to permit McGee to subsist solely on benefits 
when he is capable of working at available jobs. The Commission asserts the overall purpose 
of the Workers Compensation Act is to provide coverage and compensation.5 The permanent 
total disability statute has, however, a more specific purpose articulated by the legislature that 
the Commission ignores - to return citizens to the workforce. Utah Code Section 
34A-2-413(6) states that a finding of permanent total disability is not final until an 
administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant 
to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act. Utah Code Section 34A-8-102 states 
that the Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act "is intended to promote and . . . assist the 
injured worker in returning to the work force as quickly as possible." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-8-102 (1997); see also (1995 General Legislative Session, Senate Bill 123, Senate 
Floor Debates, Day 37 (discussing the goal of returning workers to the workforce who are 
able to work and contribute to society)). Refusing other work reasonably available because 
it pays less than the current state average weekly wage is contrary to that specific purpose. 
McGee is capable of gainful employment. As outlined above, the express purpose of the 
5
 This initial purpose of the worker's compensation system scheme as a whole, 
providing coverage and compensation to injured workers, has already been satisfied in 
this case because Mr. McGee's medical expenses, temporary total and permanent partial 
disability benefits have already been paid. The specific purpose of the permanent total 
disability statute, returning citizens to the workforce, is the purpose of utmost concern at 
this point in the administrative process. 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act is to promote the return of injured workers to work. 
If Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-1 O.D.I is enforced as written, to eliminate from 
consideration jobs that are beneath the state weekly average wage for workers like McGee, 
it will significantly undermine the purpose and efficacy of the Utah Injured Worker 
Reemployment Act to return workers who are capable of working to the workforce. Nothing 
in that statute requires an employer to provide employment at the state average weekly wage 
or any other specific wage amount. Rather, the statute seeks to return injured workers to the 
work force as quickly as possible. 
The Commission, in arguing the absurdity of how the statute works without the rule, 
stretches and mischaracterizes Petitioners' argument. The Commission suggests that, under 
Petitioners' alleged interpretation, jobs in Alaska or Florida could be used as other work 
reasonably available. (Comm'n Br. at 10.) However, the Commission ignores past case law 
addressing this point. The Court of Appeals indicated that a job offered must be "an actual 
job within a reasonable distance from [the employee's] home." Hoskingsv. Indus. Comm'n, 
918 P.2d 150,157 (Utah App. 1996) (citing Lyons v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund. 565 P.2d 
1360, 1364 (Idaho 1977)). Petitioners have suggested no variance from this case law. 
Moreover, Petitioners identified and explained the legislative history on this point. That 
history indicates that the terms "national economy" and "local economy" were both 
discussed. Neither were adopted, thus defaulting to the case law on point. 
In short, the Commission argues the statute is plain so it can obtain the standard of 
review most beneficial to it and, on the other hand, argues the plainness of the statute works 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an absurd result that must be corrected by a rule. This court should not be misled by these 
inconsistent positions. The statute is plain. There is no language addressing the standard of 
review, and the statute provides five factors for considering whether other work is reasonably 
available. It does not create an absurd result based on its plain language. Just because the 
legislation results in an outcome that is undesirable to McGee and the Commission does not 
mean that the legislation creates an absurd result. Arguably it is just as "absurd" to permit 
a person to subsist solely on benefits when that person is capable of working at available 
jobs. Therefore, the Commission should be given no deference and the Rule should be 
stricken. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 34A-2-413 (1 )(c)(iv) is plain on its face, not ambiguous or broad in any respect 
and, therefore, does not grant discretion to the Commission to determine if a conflict exists 
between an administrative rale and the statute. Because the statute is plain and self-defining 
and the Commission has no discretion, the Commission cannot create a rule that expands on 
the statute. 
The administrative rale conflicts with the statute. Rule 612-1-10.D.1 adds, among 
other things, the consideration of the state average weekly wage to claims of permanent total 
disability and clearly expands on the statute. Therefore, the rale is invalid as a matter of law. 
Because the rale is invalid, the award of permanent total disability benefits must be reversed. 
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DATED this day of , 2008. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
MARK R. SUMSION 
MICHAEL K. WOOLLEY 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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